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DISCRIMINATION AT WILL:
JOB SECURITY PROTECTIONS  
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY  
IN CONFLICT 
ABSTRACT 
The conventional wisdom amongst scholars and advocates of 
employment discrimination law is that the success of Title VII is 
significantly hampered by the enduring doctrine of employment at will.  
As long as employers have broad discretion to fire employees for any 
reason, no reason, or a bad reason, employers can easily get away with 
terminating or refusing to promote racial minorities and women as 
long as some credible nondiscriminatory reason, such as personal 
animosity, can be presented.  This account feeds the widely accepted 
view that employment at will and the goals of Title VII, namely equal 
employment opportunity, are at odds.  This article challenges this piece 
of conventional wisdom by showing how job security protections can 
also exacerbate racial inequality in employment.  It examines recent 
race riots and student protests against proposed labor law changes in 
France to unearth the tension between combating racial discrimination 
in hiring and protecting all employees’ job security. Scholars and 
advocates of employment discrimination law should be aware of the 
ways in which both employment at will and job security protections can 
function in different contexts to exacerbate racial inequalities in 
employment.  Such awareness should encourage the development of a 
broader perspective on equal employment opportunity that moves 
beyond the limited set of problems that are identified by the litigation of 
employment discrimination cases. 
 
Is employment at will bad for racial minorities?  Ever since 
Title VII was proposed, the tension between employment 
discrimination law and employment at will has been noticed.1
Recent empirical work shows that employment discrimination 
plaintiffs lose a lot,2 and one widely shared explanation is that their 
 
1 When Title VII was being debated, conservatives’ main objection to the 
legislation was that it would interfere with employers’ freedom of contract.  See 
Minority Report Upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on 
Judiciary Substitute for H.R. 7152, H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 
23534. 
2 See Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, & Stewart J. Schwab, How 
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 548 (2003); Wendy Parker, Lessons in 
Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 
(2006); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?. 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). 
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cases are extremely difficult to win because of the enduring rule of 
at will employment.3 Many scholars have argued or assumed that 
racial minorities would fare better under a for-cause employment 
regime, one that protects the legal right of all employees to job 
security.4
This article challenges the notion that for-cause 
employment would enhance equal employment opportunity for 
racial minorities.  It explains how a regime of general protections 
of all employees’ job security, like those prevalent in many 
European countries, can, over time, severely undermine racial 
equality in access to employment.  
 France’s recent problems are instructive.  French 
employment law made U.S. headlines5 in March 2006, as over a 
million people across the country staged massive demonstrations 
against a law that would have introduced a small dose of at will 
employment into the French workplace.6 Departing from the 
Labor Code’s general protection of employee job security, the 
March 2006 law permitted employers to hire persons under the age 
of 26 for a period of two years during which the employee could 
be terminated for any reason.  The “contrat première embauche,” 
(CPE), or “first employment contract” provision, as it was known, 
 
3 See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” 
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law 
to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 
(1996); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity 
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1177 (2003); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment 
After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2230 (1995); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: 
Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 (2006); 
4 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 156 (2003); Ann C. McGinley, 
Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443 (1996); 
Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At 
will, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001). 
5 See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Opponents of New French Labor Law Step Up 
Protests, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at A3; Elaine Sciolino & Craig S.Smith, 
Protests in France Over Youth Labor Law Turn Violent, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2006, at A1, Sebastian Rotella & Achrene Sicakyuz, 1 Million Across France 
March To Oppose Premier’s Key Labor Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at 
A21, Molly Moore, Top French Tribunal Upholds Jobs Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 
31, 2006, at A13. 
6 See Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances, JORF du 2 
avril 2006, at 4950, art. 11. 
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was ultimately rescinded by the Government in response to three 
weeks of nationwide strikes and unrest.7
An important fact that was largely ignored by American 
press accounts is that the proposal to allow at-will employment in 
limited circumstances was part of the law on “equality of 
opportunities,”8 adopted in direct response to the violent race riots 
throughout France in the fall of 2005.9 These riots also flooded 
U.S. newspaper headlines,10 as the French government declared a 
state of emergency in response to levels of unrest not seen since 
the student protests of May 1968. 11 Seeking to alleviate the mass 
unemployment of North African youths, the at will employment 
provision of the Equality of Opportunities law was intended to 
enhance the employment prospects of disadvantaged minorities.  
The French experience provides a counterweight to 
American understandings of the relationship between employment 
discrimination and employment at will, which are predominantly 
shaped by litigation experience.  In France, the strengthening of 
job security protections in the Labor Code over the last thirty years 
has coincided with reforms to strengthen employment 
 
7 See Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Will Rescind Labor Law That Caused Wide 
French Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at A1. The legislature eventually 
adopted a new law that replaced the article that contained the CPE provision.  
See Loi no. 2006-457 du 21 avril 2006 sur l’accès des jeunes à la vie active en 
entreprise, JORF du 22 avril 2006. 
8 See Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances, JORF du 2 
avril 2006 
9 The initial report proposing the bill began with a discussion of the need to 
respond to the problems of unemployment and discrimination that had motivated 
the riots. See Laurent Hénart, Rapport no. 2825 fait au nom de la commission 
des affaires culturelles, familiales, et sociales sur le projet de loi (no. 2787) pour 
l’égalité des chances, 25 janvier 2006, at 7. 
10 The increasing violence of the riots, and their spread throughout the nation, 
were reported almost daily in most of the major U.S. newspapers for about two 
weeks in November 2005, often on the front page.  See, e.g.,  Craig S. Smith, 
Chirac Appeals for Calm as Violent Protests Shake Paris’s Suburbs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A1; Cassell Bryan-Low & John Carreyrou; France 
Authorizes Curfews as Riots Cast Doubt on Its Policing System, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 8, 2005, at A1; David Ignatius, Why France Is Burning, WASH. POST. Nov. 
9, 2005, at A31.  The riots also caught the attention of U.S. legal scholars.  See 
The French Riots--Posner's Comment, Becker-Posner Blog, November 13, 2005, 
at  
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/11/the_french_riot.html (last 
visited July 21, 2006). 
11 Mark Landler, France Declares State of Emergency; Curfews To Be Imposed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A12. 
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discrimination law.  Yet, the racial gap in employment has only 
expanded during this period.  The historical and current 
sociological data support the conclusion that the Labor Code’s 
employee job security protections have contributed significantly to 
employers’ propensity to engage in both rational and irrational 
discrimination against racial minorities in hiring.  The recent 
controversies in France, from race riots to student strikes, should 
inform American approaches to reforming employment law to 
eradicate racial inequality in employment. 
Part I articulates the predominant view amongst American 
scholars that at-will employment is at odds with the goals of 
employment discrimination law.  It begins by establishing that 
equal employment opportunity has long been understood to be the 
primary goal of Title VII. 
Part II contrasts the goals justifying U.S. employment 
discrimination law with those underlying French employment 
discrimination law.  In France, the Labor Code’s prohibition of 
discrimination in employment is not about group-based 
disadvantage:  It is part of a general protection of employees’ 
rights against arbitrary treatment by the employer.  This very 
bundle of employee rights encompasses the right to job security. 
 Part III establishes that the widespread race riots 
throughout France was a reaction, in large part, to the problem of 
the mass unemployment of French people of North African origin 
residing in the suburbs of major cities.  It then argues that French 
employee job security protections have, over the last thirty years, 
have exacerbated racial disadvantage in access to employment. 
 Part IV explains why at-will employment was proposed in 
France in order to alleviate racial inequality and promote equal 
opportunity.  It also explains the logic of the massive social 
movement that resisted and ultimately killed the at-will provision.  
 Parts V and VI draw insights from the French experience 
that illuminate a rethinking of American law’s pursuit of equal 
employment opportunity.  The central lesson is that limiting 
employer discretion in termination can exacerbate discriminatory 
tendencies in hiring.  As a result, no reforms should be undertaken 
without considering their broader potential effects on the political 
economy of employment and their consequences for racial 
minorities’ access to jobs.  Such considerations may require 
broader, long-term, approaches to equal employment opportunity 
that move beyond the lens and apparatus of civil litigation. 
Suk, Discrimination at Will 
 5
I. Title VII and Employment at Will:  An Uneasy 
Coexistence 
 
C. Title VII’s Goal: Equal Employment Opportunity 
 
The goal of employment discrimination law in the United 
States is equal employment opportunity, defined in light of the 
historical circumstances that gave rise to Title VII.12 So 
understood, equal employment opportunity means eradicating the 
disadvantages of excluded and subordinated groups in acquiring 
and retaining jobs.13 More specifically, the primary goal of Title 
VII, the first employment discrimination statute, was to eradicate 
race-based disadvantages, particularly the severe disadvantages 
faced by African Americans.14 As Alfred Blumrosen observed in 
1968, the crucial social fact giving rise to Title VII was the 
disproportionately high unemployment rate among blacks.15 
Title VII also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, 
national origin, and religion,16 expressing the message that 
employment disadvantage on the basis of membership in these 
groups was also unacceptable.  But it is clear that the main impetus 
for passing Title VII was a growing civil rights movement whose 
primary goal was to undo racial segregation and its disadvantaging 
effects on African Americans in education and employment.17 
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII was part, 
was a comprehensive federal statute attempting to eradicate 
various aspects of racial segregation and black disadvantage in 
voting, employment, education, and public accommodations.18 
So, naturally, the eradication of race-based disadvantage 
has been articulated, both by scholars19 and by the Supreme 
 
12 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). 
13 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
14 See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 203. 
15 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 465 (1968) (attributing 
this goal to the Truman Committee on Civil Rights in 1947). 
16 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
17 See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 53-56 (1992). 
18 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964). 
19 The classic statement to this effect was made by Owen Fiss, Groups and the 
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL.& PUB. AFF 107 (1976) (arguing that the Equal 
Protection Clause should be understood to prohibit group-disadvantaging state 
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Court,20 as the main goal of employment discrimination law. 
Although employment discrimination law has been extended to 
other groups, the history of group-based disadvantage has always 
been an important background for the interpretation of the 
antidiscrimination norm.  Although the statute protects employees 
as individuals, it does so only insofar as the individual has been 
treated badly as a member of a group, and does not protect the 
individual from all forms of arbitrary and unjustified treatment by 
the employer.  These features of U.S. employment discrimination 
law, as we shall see, make it distinctive.21 
D. Employment at Will and Its Limits 
 
The rule of employment at will allows either the employer 
or the employee to terminate the employment relationship at any 
time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason.  As is well known, 
the legal right to fire for bad reasons is not absolute;22 both 
 
action).  Cynthia Estlund has argued that Title VII should be understood as an 
“equal protection clause for the workplace.”  Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the 
Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 
(2005).   See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2006) (arguing that the best 
explanation for employment discrimination law is its reflection of a broad goal 
of social change to eliminate group-based status inequalities).  
20 In Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the Supreme Court, in inventing the 
disparate impact theory of liability, saw Title VII as requiring “the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers 
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.”  401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
view that the goal of Title VII was to eradicate group-based disadvantage in 
access to employment in United Steelworkers v. Weber, in holding that 
voluntary employer affirmative action policies did not violate Title VII.  The 
Court characterized the goals of the Civil Rights Act as “the integration of 
blacks into the mainstream of American society.”  United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). 
21 For a more detailed discussion of the distinctive features of U.S. 
antidiscrimination law as compared with the French model, see Julie C. Suk, 
Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 
AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming August 2007) 
22 Indeed, the defenders of employment at will view the limits imposed on it by 
antidiscrimination, labor, and wrongful discharge doctrine to be excessive.  See 
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 
(1984);  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1990); Andrew P. 
Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful 
Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996). 
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legislatures and courts have rendered some reasons for termination 
illegitimate.   
 Title VII is perhaps the most salient example. Title VII 
prohibits the employer from terminating an employment 
relationship based on the employee’s race, color, sex, religion, or 
national origin.23 Other antidiscrimination laws, state and federal, 
also protect against discrimination on the basis of disability,24 
age,25 or sexual orientation.26 The antidiscrimination exceptions 
to employment at will embody a policy against employment 
decisions based on traits that have been but should not be a basis 
for group disadvantage.27 
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits employers 
from taking adverse actions against employees due to their union 
membership or activities.28 State whistleblower statutes protect 
employees’ right to speak out with regard to the employer’s illegal 
activities.29 And many state courts have invalidated or provided 
remedies for wrongful termination when the termination is against 
public policy, such as a termination in retaliation for an 
employee’s reporting of a crime.30 
Nonetheless, despite these restrictions on employer 
discretion, the employee protections are exceptions that coexist 
with the rule of at will employment.  For the most part, employers 
still retain broad firing discretion.  In the early days of Title VII, 
some American labor and civil rights scholars believed or hoped 
that Title VII would be extended to encompass general job security 
protections for all workers,31 especially after the 1973 case of 
 
23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (2000). 
24 Americans With Disabilities Act , 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). 
25 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000). 
26 For instance, New York’s employment discrimination statute includes sexual 
orientation as a prohibited category.  See N. Y. CLS Exec. § 296 (1a) (Consol. 
2006). 
27 Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At will World, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1669 (1996). 
28 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
29 For example, New York has a whistleblower statute, at N.Y. Lab. Law. § 740 
(Consol. 1988), and New Jersey has a Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
that protects employees who engage in whistle-blowing activities.   N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 34:19-1-19-8 (2006). 
30 See, e.g., Petermann v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 
1959).    
31 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: Workers Are Entitled to “Just 
Cause” Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 519,  520 (1978) (“[T]he 
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McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company32 read Title 
VII to prohibit race-based discrimination against whites. But to the 
dismay of many critics of employment at will,33 no such 
universalistic ban on arbitrary discharge has emerged.  An 
employee cannot be fired on the basis of race, but she can be fired 
for wearing a hairstyle that the employer doesn’t like.34 An 
employee cannot be fired because he is black, but he can be fired if 
the boss personally dislikes him and he happens to be black.35 
E. Employment at Will and Title VII Litigation 
 
Since Title VII was passed, allegations of discriminatory 
firing have been litigated far more frequently than allegations of 
discriminatory hiring.36 Most of these cases are individual 
disparate treatment cases.37 In the at-will universe, the Title VII 
plaintiff may allege that she was fired on the basis of race or sex, 
but faces great difficulty in the doctrinal scheme of Title VII 
litigation if the employer claims that she was fired for all kinds of 
bad reasons, as long as those bad reasons are not group-based 
traits. Obviously, such a defense, if true, is legitimate in a world 
where at will employment is the background norm.  By contrast, if 
the background rule was a presumption of job security protection, 
 
common law rule of employer discretion has been superseded by the principle 
that personnel decisions must be based on just cause.   The just cause standard 
arse initially under Title VII . . ..”); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from 
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L. J,. 1, 20 (1979) 
(arguing that McDonnell Douglas’s requirement that an employer-defendant put 
forth a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” after a plaintiff’s prima facie case 
effectively produced a just-cause standard). 
32 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
33 See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The 
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000); ); Joseph 
Slater, The “American Rule” That Swallows the Exceptions, EMPLOYEE RTS &
EMPLOYEE POL’Y (forthcoming 2007); Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, 
There Are Many Ways:  Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment 
at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295 (2005). 
34 Cf. Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(holding that an employer policy prohibiting employees from wearing all-
braided hairstyles is not a violation of Title VII). 
35 These are the facts of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.  See St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
36John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991). 
37 Id. 
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whereby the employee could not be fired except for just cause, 
with just cause defined as employee’s job-related fault or 
employer’s significant economic hardship, it follows that a 
personal animosity defense (to name one example of a bad reason) 
would not be a legitimate reason available to an employer-
defendant in an employment discrimination lawsuit.  Under a for-
cause employment regime, an employer’s inability to articulate and 
prove a good reason for terminating an employee would enable the 
employee plaintiff to prevail. 
For the last fifteen years, employment discrimination 
scholars have argued that the goals of Title VII have been 
undermined by the endurance of the American doctrine of 
employment at will.38 Although the critics of at will employment 
acknowledge that the at will rule is formally limited by Title VII 
and other exceptions,39 many scholars have argued that what 
remains of employment at will seriously undermines the 
effectiveness of employment discrimination law in bringing about 
race and gender equality in the workplace. Specifically, the 
background norm of employment at will affects the burdens of 
production and proof under the McDonnell Douglas framework 
when individual Title VII cases are litigated, often to the detriment 
of plaintiffs. 
The notion that employment at will is a doctrinal barrier to 
the employment discrimination plaintiff’s case was fully 
articulated after the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks.40 In that case, Hicks, a black correctional 
 
38 See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and 
Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1
(1990); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After 
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2230 (1995); Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge 
Protections in an At will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1996); William R. 
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the Escalating 
Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at 
Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996); Ann C. 
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 
1443 (1996); Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and 
Employment At will, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001); Chad Derum & Karen 
Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the 
Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003). 
39 For example, Cynthia Estlund points out that “the legal right to fire for bad 
reasons has been virtually decimated.”  Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge 
Protections in an At will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996). 
40 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
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officer was subject to repeated and severe disciplinary actions after 
a new supervisor had come into office.  The employee was 
eventually demoted and then discharged.  Hicks brought a Title 
VII action, in which he presented a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green. 41 The defendant proffered 
nondiscriminatory reasons that the district court found to be false.  
Nonetheless, the district court found for the defendant because the 
plaintiff had fnot proven that the employer’s actions were “racially 
rather than personally motivated.”42 
Prior to the Hicks case, Title VII plaintiffs alleging 
disparate treatment benefited from an effective presumption that 
discrimination had occurred based on circumstantial evidence if 
they were able to prove the elements of a McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case.  The employer would then have the burden of 
producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.  
After Furnco Construction v. Waters43 and Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine,44 some courts took this to mean 
that, if the employer gave reasons that were not credible, or if the 
employer gave no reason at all for its decision, the plaintiff would 
prevail.45 However, Hicks held that, even if the employer puts 
forth a reason that is not worthy of credence, or no reason at all for 
 
41 Under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff could 
establish a prima facie case without direct evidence by proving (1) that he was a 
member of a protected group, (2) that he was qualified for the job, (3) he applied 
for the job and was rejected, and (4) the job continued to remain open. 
42 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993). 
43 439 U.S. 567 (1978). 
44 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
45 In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, the Supreme Court stated that “a prima 
facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination onlly 
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than 
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors . . . we are likely to 
presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than 
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying 
reasons, especially in a business setting.”  439 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).  In 
Burdine, the Court extended this reasoning by explicitly noting that a plaintiff 
can show that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer than 
the proffered reason simply by showing that the proffered explanation was 
unworthy of credence.  450 U.S. at 256.  As  Malamud notes, the circuits applied 
Burdine very differently with regard to the question of whether a plaintiff who 
convinced the factfinder that the employer’s proffered reason was false was then 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last 
Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2223 n.23 
(1993). 
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its actions, the the trier of fact is not required to find for the 
plaintiff.  Unless the plaintiff proves that the employer’s falsity or 
lack of reason stems from racial motivation (as opposed to, say, 
arbitrary personal hatred), Hicks held that the plaintiff would not 
be entitled to prevail.46 The implication of Hicks was that the law 
permitted employers to act arbitrarily, irrationally and hatefully, as 
long as the arbitrariness, irrationality, and hatred was not 
motivated by one of Title VII’s protected categories, such as race. 
Many scholars reacted to the Hicks decision by attacking 
employment at-will.47 They argued that, in a workplace where 
employers are permitted to terminate employees without just 
cause, arbitrary acts against members of racial minorities and 
women are not considered unlawful, however adversely it might 
affect them.48 According to many commentators, the background 
norm of employment at will prevented courts from recognizing the 
situations in which arbitrary and adverse treatment of racial 
minorities could constitute racial discrimination.  Some critics, like 
Ann McGinley, explicitly proposed the eradication of employment 
at will through federal or state legislation,49 drawing on some 
 
46 Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). 
47 It should be noted, however, that scholars began to notice the significance of 
employment at will as a barrier to the success of Title VII prior to Hicks. See,
e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note __, at 70-72. 
48 See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” 
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law 
to Employment at Will:  Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV.
305, 330 (1996) (arguing that Hicks was evidence of the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to displace employment at will to the extent necessary to effectuate Title 
VII’s goal); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will 
World, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1655, 1679 (1996) (arguing that employment at-will 
undermines Title VII); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and 
Employment at Will, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443 (1996) (urging the adoption of a 
national discharge policy prohibiting employers from discharging an employee 
without just cause, for the sake of achieving race and gender equality); Donna E. 
Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At will, 34 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001) (proposing greater general protections for 
employee job security, including prior notice of dismissal or pay in lieu of 
notice, in light of the collaborative role played by employment at will in the 
subordination of women and people of color).  Deborah Malamud observed that 
“wrongful, or at least undefendable, employer actions are significant problems 
in the American workplace, even outside of the setting of actionable 
discrimination.”  See The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2233 n.23 (1993). 
49 See McGinley, supra note 48, at 1511-12.  See also Young, supra note 48. 
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foreign countries’ laws protecting job security, which effectively 
prohibit termination except for good cause.50 
This critique has enduring salience in recent employment 
discrimination scholarship.51 Building on the insights of law and 
economics scholars, Cynthia Estlund, in her important and 
acclaimed book, Working Together, argues that employers have 
perverse disincentives to hire racial minorities when Title VII 
operates in the context of employment at-will.52 Estlund builds on 
an insight first mentioned by Richard Posner and developed by 
John Donohue and Peter Siegelman with regard to the efficacy of 
Title VII:  The possibility of discriminatory firing suits under Title 
VII leads the employer to avoid hiring minorities due to the 
incurring expenses in a Title VII-firing suit.53 In their 1991 
empirical study of employment discrimination litigation, Donohue 
and Siegelman showed that, since the early 1970s, firing cases 
under Title VII have overwhelmingly outnumbered hiring 
charges.54 Under these conditions, a reasonable employer is likely 
to fear a firing case more than a hiring case, which produces a net 
 
50 McGinley borrows from the job security laws of the Virgin Islands, France, 
and Germany, see McGinley, supra note __, at 1511, 151514, 1519-21.  
McGinley acknowledges, however, that the labor laws of France and Germany 
are more restrictive of the employer’s prerogative than her own proposal.  Id at 
1520-21.  Young notes that the United States “stands virtually alone among 
Western industrialized nations in its failure to furnish its workers adequate job 
security.” Young, supra note __, at 355.  See also Comment, Employment-at 
will: The French Experience As a Basis For Reform, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J., 294 
(1988); Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden?  A 
Comparative Study of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1033 (1995). 
51 See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity 
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1177 (2003) (arguing that both employment at will and the difficulties 
faced by Title VII in addressing unconscious bias have detracted from 
employment discrimination law’s ability to combat discrimination); CYNTHIA 
ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003); Joseph Slater, The “American Rule” That 
Swallows the Exceptions, EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPLOYEE POL’Y (forthcoming 
2007). 
52 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 152 (2003). 
53 Richard Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513, 519 (1987). 
54 John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1016 (1991) (see Figure 6). 
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disincentive to hire racial minorities.55 As Ian Ayres and Peter 
Siegelman put it, “protection against discriminatory firing acts as a 
kind of tax on hiring those to whom it is extended.”56 Estlund 
refers to this problem as the “at-will gap,” arguing that these 
perverse disincentives arise largely due to the persistence of at-will 
employment.57 The at-will employer can fire employees who are 
unprotected by antidiscrimination statutes without fear of liability, 
but cannot fire protected employees without considering the cost of 
defending suit.58 One solution, Estlund argues, is to move to a 
just-cause regime for the sake of “refining the ‘equal protection 
clause’ of the workplace.59 
Regardless of one’s policy conclusion as to whether 
employment at will should be abolished in favor of a for-just-cause 
employment regime, most U.S. scholars seem to agree that the 
employment at will doctrine is in tension with employment 
discrimination law.  This explains why Richard Epstein, a vocal 
defender of employment at will,60 has called for the repeal of 
employment discrimination law.61 
In other words, whether they come out in favor of a for-
just-cause employment regime or not, most U.S. scholars see a 
conflict between the goals and principles underlying the 
employment at will doctrine and the goals and principles 
underlying employment discrimination law. The conventional 
wisdom is that employment at will undermines the goals of 
employment discrimination law.  Furthermore, many 
commentators assume that pursuing the goal of employment 
discrimination law (namely, giving disadvantaged groups access to 
good jobs) is contiguous with protecting all employees’ job 
security.62 But the persistence of vast racial inequalities in 
 
55 See id. at 1024. 
56 Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-World as Red Herring: Why Disparate 
Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1487 
(1996). 
57 Estlund, supra note 52, at 156. 
58 Estlund also develops this view in Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge 
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX L. REV. 1655, 1679 (1996). 
59 Estlund, supra note 52, at 156. 
60 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947 (1984). 
61 RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 148 (1990). 
62 See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No more: All Workers Are entitle d 
to “Just Cause” Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 519, 565 (1978); 
Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change 
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employment in other post-industrial societies that have strongly 
protected employee job security challenges this assumption. 
 
II. The French Alternative:  Republicanism and 
Universalism in Employment Discrimination Law 
 
France provides a fruitful resource for thinking about job 
security and racial inequality, particularly as recent waves of 
internationally-noticed riots and strikes have highlighted these 
issues. From an American perspective, the sight of a massive social 
movement against a small dose of employment at will seems 
surreal,63 since contingent employment with no legal protection of 
job security is the norm for American workers.64 
In France, by contrast, for-cause employment is the 
background norm that shapes other aspects of workplace 
regulation.  Like U.S. law, French law also prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of group membership by employers,65 
but unlike U.S. law, French labor law considers the norm against 
discrimination as a natural extension of a general package of 
employee rights protections.  The norm against discrimination fits 
comfortably with the Labor Code’s many limits on employer 
 
in the Law, 40 OHIO. ST. L. J. 1, 49 (1979).  More recently, Cynthia Estlund 
argues that “the legal rights of employees and the corresponding limitations on 
employer power that have developed since 1964 provide rudimentary analogues 
to the constitutional rights of citizens as against the government,” suggesting 
that the right against discrimination is part of a more universal right.  See 
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
318-19 (2005).  Ann McGinley argues that “[a]n employee who is discharged 
without just cause is an innocent victim of the employment at will doctrine.  
Dismissed employees suffer economic loss, relocation costs, depression, and 
loss of self esteem . . . The average worker finds herself in the same position as 
that of blacks and women before the existence of the antidiscrimination laws.”  
Ann McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will:  Toward a 
Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443, 1500 (1995).  
McGinley sees the employee discharged for a bad reason as suffering essentially 
the same injury as an employee who is discriminated against on the basis of 
race, sex, or other group traits. 
63 For a discussion of the French employment law controversy from an 
American perspective, see William Pfaff, France: The Children’s Hour, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, Vol. LIII, No. 8 (May 11, 2006), at 40. 
64 See Clyde Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP.
LAB. L. J. 503 (1997) (detailing the unstable nature of most Americans’ 
employment). 
65 See C. trav. Art. L 122-45 (2006). 
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discretion,66 which function to protect the rights of employees to 
job security and liberty in the workplace.  As a result, although the 
law prohibits discrimination in hiring as well as disciplining and 
termination, the focus is on the protection of incumbent 
employees, rather than potential employees. 
 
A. The Labor Code’s Discrimination Provision 
 
The French law that is analogous to Title VII’s prohibition 
of employment discrimination under threat of civil liability67 came 
into being through a statute on “the liberties of workers in the 
enterprise,” which generally protected employees from the 
discretion of their employers.  The 1982 law provided that “No 
employee can be punished or terminated because of his origin, sex, 
family situation, or membership in an ethnicity, nation, or race, 
political opinions, union membership, or religious convictions.”68 
Punishing or sanctioning a worker was defined by the statute as 
“any measure, other than verbal observations, taken by the 
employer after an act of the employee considered by the employer 
to be faulty, whether or not the measure immediately affects the 
presence of the worker in the enterprise, his function, his career, or 
his pay.”69 The provision was later modified to prohibit 
discrimination in recruitment and hiring as well.  Codified at Labor 
Code L. 122-45, the version of this provision currently in force 
provides: 
No person can be excluded from a recruitment 
procedure or from access to an internship or period 
of training in an enterprise, no employee can be 
disciplined, terminated, or made the object of a 
discriminatory measure, direct or indirect, notably 
in matters of pay, training, placement, assignment, 
qualification, classification, professional promotion, 
change, or contract renewal because of his or her 
origin, sex, morals, sexual orientation, age, family 
situation, genetic characteristics, membership or 
 
66 See C. trav. Art. L. 122-4 et seq. 
67 Note that French law also imposes criminal liability for intentional 
discrimnation in employment.  See infra, note 72. 
68 Loi no. 82-689 du 4 août 1982 relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans 
l’entreprise (1), Section VI, Sous-section II, J.O.R.F. du 6 août 1982, at 2519. 
69 Id. See also C. Trav. L. 122-40. 
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non-membership, real or supposed, in an ethnicity, 
nation, or race, his or her political opinions, union 
activities, religious convictions, physical 
appearance, family name, or, with the exception of 
an inability confirmed by the medical inspector of 
labor, because of his or her state of health or 
handicap.70 
Like Title VII and in contrast to the French criminal provision, the 
French Labor Code’s antidiscrimination provision prohibits 
“indirect” (or disparate impact) discrimination71 as well as 
intentional or “direct” discrimination, and applies not only to 
hiring and firing, but to all the terms and conditions of 
employment, which are spelled out in the provision.  
The French prohibition of discrimination in hiring and 
firing originated in a criminal provision,72 still in effect, that was 
 
70 C. trav. L. 122-45.  (“Aucune personne ne peut être écartée d'une procédure de 
recrutement ou de l'accès à un stage ou à une période de formation en entreprise, 
aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l'objet d'une mesure 
discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte, notamment en matière de rémunération, au 
sens de l'article L. 140-2, de mesures d'intéressement ou de distribution 
d'actions, de formation, de reclassement, d'affectation, de qualification, de 
classification, de promotion professionnelle, de mutation ou de renouvellement 
de contrat en raison de son origine, de son sexe, de ses moeurs, de son 
orientation sexuelle, de son âge, de sa situation de famille ou de sa grossesse, de 
ses caractéristiques génétiques, de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance, 
vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation ou une race, de ses opinions 
politiques, de ses activités syndicales ou mutualistes, de ses convictions 
religieuses, de son apparence physique, de son patronyme ou en raison de son 
état de santé ou de son handicap.”) 
71 “Indirect” discrimination, a concept imported into French law from European 
directives which were themselves influenced by British law, corresponds 
roughly to the American notion of “disparate impact” discrimination, developed 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (holding that facially 
neutral practices with a disproportionate impact on blacks violate Title VII if 
they cannot be justified by reference to business necessity). 
72 C. Pén. Art. L. 225-2 makes discrimination punishable by three years’ 
imprisonment or € 45,000 when it consists of “refusal to hire, disciplining, and 
termination.”  Article L. 225-1 defines discrimination as “any distinction 
operated between physical persons by reason of their origin, their sex, their 
family situation, their size, their physical appearance, their family name, their 
state of health, their handicap, their genetic characteristics, their morals, the 
sexual orientation, their age, their political opinions, their union activities, their 
membership or non-membership, real or supposed, in a particular ethnicity, 
nation, race, or religion. » C. Pén. Art. 225-1 (Partie législative).  («  Constitue 
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passed in 1972 as part of a comprehensive anti-racism statute.73 
The antiracism statute was enacted before the enactment of the 
civil prohibition of employment discrimination was added to the 
Labor Code.  The rest of the provisions in the 1972 law against 
racism had little to do with employment.  The law’s focus was on 
intentional acts of racism, primarily hate speech, for which the law 
imposed criminal liability.74 
The French Labor Code’s employment discrimination 
provision must also be understood in the context of the broader 
legal statutory package that accompanied it, as well as the regime 
of employment law into which it was inserted.   The 1982 statute 
establishing a civil remedy for discriminatory firing and 
disciplining in the workplace was part of a series of legal reforms 
known as the “Lois Auroux.”  Named for the Labor Minister, Jean 
Auroux, these laws strengthened employee rights significantly, 
particularly with regard to job security and the employee’s right to 
participation in the governance of the enterprise.   
 
B. Employee Protection and Republican Citizenship 
 
The reforms were premised on the principle that workers 
ought to be citizens and full participants in the enterprise.75 The 
 
une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les personnes physiques à 
raison de l'origine, du sexe, de la situation de famille, de l'apparence physique, 
du patronyme, de l'état de santé, du handicap, des caractéristiques génétiques, 
des moeurs, de l'orientation sexuelle, de l'âge, des opinions politiques, des 
activités syndicales, de l'appartenance ou de la non-appartenance, vraie ou 
supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion déterminée des 
membres ou de certains membres de ces personnes morales. »)  Article 225-1 
repeats the exact same language as applied to « moral persons, » which include 
corporations. 
73 Loi No. 72-546 du 1er juillet 1972. 
74 The 1972 law modified the freedom of the press statute of 1881, which 
already prohibited attacks in the press against racial and religious groups.  The 
1972 statute strengthened this regulation of racist speech, by criminally 
prohibiting speech provoking racial hatred, as well as defamation and insults of 
a racial nature, when they were targeted at individuals belonging to these groups 
in addition to the groups themselves. Loi No. 72-546 du 1er juillet 1972,art. 1-4. 
That statute, the first law prohibiting discrimination, implemented France’s 
obligations under the United Nations’ International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 
75 Jean Auroux, Les droits des travailleurs, Rapport au Président de la 
République et au Premier ministre, Septembre 1981, Collections des rapport 
officiels, available at Ladocumentationfrançaise.fr. 
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reforms were seen as an extension of the constitutional guarantee 
of the right to work.  The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution 
declares that “[e]ach person has the duty to work and the right to 
employment,”76 and that “[a]ll men may defend their rights and 
interests through union action and may belong to the union of their 
choice.”77 The Preamble also invokes the “right to strike,” to be 
exercised within limits set by law.78 It guarantees to all workers 
the opportunity to participate in the collective determination of 
their conditions of work and in the management of the 
workplace.79 The 1946 Preamble re-established the commitment 
to workers’ rights that had been established by the Third Republic 
in 1936.  The Matignon Accords, adopted by Prime Minister Léon 
Blum’s government in that year, guaranteed French workers a 40-
hour workweek and two weeks of paid vacation a year.80 The 
1946 Preamble has been incorporated into the constitution that is 
currently in force. 
The purpose of the 1982 law was to protect workers’ rights 
to exercise their “public liberties” in the workplace.81 It was 
understood that the public rights of workers necessitated the 
regulation of employer discretion, particularly the disciplinary 
power of the employer.  The statute had three main components:  
First, it required all employers with more than 20 employees to 
establish internal written rules of conduct for employees,82 making 
explicit the conduct that could be punished by the employer.  
Second, it protected the employees from being punished by the 
employer for certain reasons, limiting the employers’ discretion.83 
76 Preamble to the 1946 Const. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See JEAN PELISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT, & ANTOINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU 
TRAVAIL 17 (23d ed. 2006).  These protections have only gotten better for 
French employees.  As of 2000, French employees enjoy a 35-hour workweek 
and 5 weeks of paid vacation annually. See C. trav. Art. L. 212-1; 223-4. 
81 Jean Auroux, Les droits des travailleurs, Rapport au Président de la 
République et au Premier ministre, Septembre 1981, La Documentation 
Française, at 7. 
82 Loi no. 82-689 du 4 août 1982 relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans 
l’entreprise (1), art. 1, Journal officiel de la République française (J.O.R.F.) du 6 
août 1982, at 2518. 
83 Id., art. 1-6. 
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Third, it protected the right of employees to express their opinions 
with regard to the conditions of work in the enterprise.84 
All three components of the law were consistent with a 
conception of the worker as an equal citizen of the enterprise.  One 
of the main provisions of the statute was to protect the freedom of 
expression of workers, guaranteeing the employee a right to “direct 
and collective expression” on matters having to do with the 
conditions of work,85 by declaring that the expressed opinions of 
an employee, regardless of his or her place in the professional 
hierarchy, could not motivate a punishment or termination of the 
worker.   Furthermore, Auroux’s report proposing the law argued 
that workers ought to be agents of change with regard to decisions 
that directly interested them.86 Thus, the Auroux law’s prohibition 
of discrimination has to be read in light of this conception of the 
employee as a citizen of the enterprise, who had rights not to be 
treated arbitrarily as well as rights to participation in decisions that 
affected him or her. 
The 1982 Auroux laws built on a Labor Code that already 
protected employee rights to job security.  For over a hundred 
years, French law has limited arbitrary dismissals, so the protection 
against wrongful discharge is much older than the regulation of 
employment discrimination.  Since 1890, French employers do not 
enjoy a unilateral right to terminate an employee for bad reasons.  
In fact, at around the same time that employment at will became 
the default rule in most U.S. jurisdictions at the end of the 19th 
century,87 the legal protection of employees from arbitrary 
discharge began to emerge in France.  Throughout the twentieth 
century, different laws and decrees protected employees from 
discharge based on one’s military service88 or performance of other 
public duties,89 terminations because one took maternity leave 
 
84 Id. art. 7-10 
85 See Auroux, supra note __, at 8-9.  See also Loi no. 82-689 du 4 août 1982 
relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans l’entreprise (1), art. 7,  J.O.R.F. du 6 
août 1982, at 2520.  Article 7 added Title VI to Book IV of the Labor Code, 
which protected the employees’ right to expression in defining actions towards 
improving the conditions of work in the enterprise.  Id. 
86 Auroux, supra note __, at 15. 
87 See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118, 125-26 (1976) (arguing that the American at will rule 
emerged and was solidified in treatises around the 1870s). 
88 Loi no. 49-1092 du 2 ouût 1949, JORF du 6 août 1949. 
89 Decret no. 55-156 du 2 février 1955, JORF du 3 février 1955. 
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from six weeks before delivery until eight weeks after,90 and 
terminations based on participation in strikes.  Civil courts also 
held discharges based on membership in labor unions91 or based on 
religious or political beliefs92 to be abusive.   
Furthermore, a 1958 statute imposed on employers the 
obligation of notice,93 and another statute in 1967 authorized 
severance pay in the case of termination.94 In 1973, the legislature 
adopted a Labor Code provision that imposed on employers the 
obligation to justify any termination by a true and serious cause, 
whether it was individual or economic.95 Before 1973, the 
employee bore the burden of proving that a termination was an 
abuse of right in order to be entitled to damages.  After 1973, the 
employer bore the burden of proving that the termination was 
justified by a true and serious cause, in order to avoid paying 
damages. 
Today’s Labor Code imposes a variety of procedural and 
substantive duties on employers undertaking to terminate an 
employee.  For starters, the Labor Code severely restricts the 
circumstances under which employers can enter into temporary 
employment contracts, known as contracts for a specified duration.  
Such contracts are prohibited for jobs related to the normal and 
permanent activity of an enterprise.96 The law only allows fixed-
term contracts for work that is temporary, such as replacing an 
absent employee, a temporary project of the enterprise, or seasonal 
work, to name a few examples.97 All other contracts must be 
“contracts for an unspecified duration,” and can be terminated at 
any time by either party, subject to (very extensive) regulations by 
the Code. 98 
The Labor Code’s regulations prohibit arbitrary dismissals, 
and impose employer costs on carrying out just-cause dismissals.  
If an employee is dismissed for any reason other than a “serious 
 
90 Loi no. 50-205 du 11 février 1950, JORF du 12 février 1950. 
91 Judgment of Civil Court, Mar. 18, 1930, D. P. II 171 (Fr.) 
92 Judgment of Civil Court of Lille, Feb. 19, 1906 [1909] D. P. II 121 (Fr.). 
93 Jean PELISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT, & ANOTINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 20 
(23d ed. 2006). 
94 Id. 
95 Loi no. 73-3 du 13 juillet 1973 ; see generally JEAN PELISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT,
& ANOTINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 22 (23d ed. 2006). 
96 C. trav. Art. L. 122-1. 
97 C. trav. Art. L. 121-1-1. 
98 C. trav. Art. L. 122-4. 
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fault,” the Labor Code entitles the employee to a period of notice 
of one month if he has been with the employer for at least 6 
months, and two months if he has been with the employer for at 
least two years.99 The notice is required even when the termination 
is justified by a “real and serious cause,” including economic 
difficulty.  If the notice period is not observed, except in instances 
of serious fault, the employee is entitled to damages independent 
of the severance pay.  The Labor Code also strictly regulates 
severance payments.  Except in cases of serious fault, a terminated 
employee who has worked for the employer for at least two years 
is entitled to minimum severance payments calculated by 
regulations.100 
The Labor Code further requires an employer proposing 
termination to send a letter and summons to the employee.101 The 
letter must explain the reasons for the proposed termination. The 
employee is thus summonsed to an interview, during which the 
employer gives the reasons for the proposed decision.102 This 
process applies even when the employer proposes to terminate 
employees as part of a reduction-in-force of at least 10 employees 
in a period of thirty days for economic reasons.103 If the dismissal 
falls within this category, the economic reasons have to be 
authorized by the competent administrative authority in order for 
the termination to be deemed justified.104 If a termination is 
unjustified, the employee will be entitled to tort damages105 and/or 
reintegration into the job from which he was wrongfully 
terminated.106 Finally, even if the termination is justified, either by 
economic reasons or “true and serious cause,” the law still requires 
the employer to pay severance. 
There are also rules governing the burdens in litigation 
challenging terminations.  In the case of an economically 
motivated termination, the employer has the burden of 
communicating to the judge all the elements that he is also 
required to communicate to the representatives of personnel and to 
the administrative authority competent to approve an economically 
 
99 C. trav. Art. L. 122-6. 
100 C. trav. Art. L. 122-9. 
101 C. trav. Art. L. 122-14. 
102 C. trav. Art. L. 122-14. 
103 C. trav. Art. L. 122-14. 
104 C. trav. Art, L. 122-14. 
105 C. trav. Art. L. 122-13. 
106 C. trav. Art. L. 122-4-4. 
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motivated layoff.107 If there is any doubt, the presumption lies in 
favor of the employee.108 
The antidiscrimination provision of the Labor Code reflects 
the understanding that what’s really wrong with employment 
discrimination is not the harms it occasions on racial or ethnic 
subgroups of the population, but the harm to certain universal 
ideals, such as right of all persons to be free from arbitrary 
mistreatment in the workplace.  Firing or disciplining someone 
because of their race is wrong because race is an arbitrary criterion 
on which to make an employment decision.  On this logic, 
however, race is not the only arbitrary criterion on which to make 
an employment decision – nor is it the worst arbitrary criterion.  It 
is equally wrong, then, to fire or discipline an employee on the 
basis of other characteristics that should not be considered, such as 
physical appearance, family name, age, and so forth.  Furthermore, 
this reasoning attributes no particular significance to the history of 
racism, sexism, or other group-based animus in France as a 
justification for the employment discrimination provision; the 
provision is justified by reference to universally applicable ideals 
of liberty and equality. 
France’s universalistic approach to the problem of 
employment discrimination is, in part, of product of a larger race-
blind approach to equality.  The French guarantee of employees’ 
rights to dignity and non-arbitrary treatment stems from the French 
conception of republican citizenship.  To envision the worker as a 
citizen of the enterprise is to extend the French ideal of political 
citizenship to the workplace.109 In this respect, French 
employment law does what many American employment law 
scholars propose: 110 it regards the workplace as a place where 
citizenship values are fostered. 
Under the French constitution, the equality of citizens 
means that citizens cannot distinguished on the basis of any 
arbitrary characteristics, including race.  The constitution explicitly 
 
107 C. trav. Art. L. 122-14-3. 
108 C. trav. Art. L. 122-14-3. 
109 Auroux, supra note __, at 6. 
110 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace Civil Society, 
and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 51-55 (2000); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886 (2000); Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from 
Work, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 373, 424 (2006);  
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prohibits the recognition of any distinctions of race,111 and a 1978 
statute prohibits the gathering or storing of data that classifies 
persons on the basis of their origins.112 The French principle of 
race-blindness is far more rigid than the American norm against 
racial classifications.113 As a result, all public policy solutions to 
the problem of racial inequality in France are race-neutral and 
universalistic.  Race-based affirmative action is out of the 
question,114 as are any measures that target benefits to members of 
groups classified by their origin. 
 
III. Race Riots and Minority Unemployment 
 
A. Race Riots 
 
111 The Preamble to the 1946 constitution, which has been incorporated into the 
1958 constitution that is currently in force, reads: 
Following the victory won by free people over regimes that attempted 
to enslave and degrade the human person, the French people proclaim 
again that every human, without distinction of race, religion, or belief, 
possesses inalienable and sacred rights.  It solemnly reaffirms the rights 
and liberties of man and citizen consecrated by the Declaration of 
Rights of Man of 1789 and the fundamental principles recognized by 
the laws of the Republic. 
The passage, in the original reads : 
Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres 
sur les régimes qui ont tenté d'asservir et de dégrader la 
personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que 
tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de 
croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés. Il réaffirme 
solennellement les droits et libertés de l'homme et du citoyen 
consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes 
fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République. 
CONST., Preamble (IVe République) (Fr.) 
112 Loi no. 78-18 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers, et aux 
libertés,   Section 2, art. 8. 
113 For comparisons of French and American race-blindness, see Erik Bleich, 
Anti-racism Without Races: Politics and Policy in a “Color-Blind” State, in 
RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF 
DIFFERENCE 162 (Herrich Chapman & Laura L. Frader eds. 2004); Robert C. 
Lieberman, A Tale of Two Countries: The Politics of Color-Blindness in France 
and the United States, in Race in France, supra, at 189;  Julie C. Suk, Equal by 
Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. 
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2007). 
114 However, affirmative action programs based on socioeconomic disadvantage, 
measured by residence in designated geographical areas, have been introduced. 
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For several weeks in November 2005, many young people 
in the poorest urban areas throughout France participated in waves 
of violence.  This has brought racial inequality to the forefront of 
French public debate.  The riots were precipitated by the death of 
two young North African men who were accidentally electrocuted 
while hiding in a dangerous location for fear of being harassed by 
the police. 115 It was a well-known fact that young North Africans 
were frequently subject to police harassment in the banlieues.116 
After these deaths, many young people in the banlieues burned 
cars, burned schools, and had violent confrontations with the 
police.   
 The predominant understanding by French intellectuals, 
politicians, and the media, was that the wave of violence was not 
only a protest against this particular event or police harassment, 
but rather, an angry reaction to all that is wrong with life in the 
banlieues, the poor urban areas on the outskirts of French cities.  
The most cited fact was the high rates of unemployment in these 
areas.117 The unemployment rate is disproportionately higher for 
members of visible minority groups in France than for others.118 
Although statistical data with regard to racial and ethnic minorities 
is rare in France, due the force of all the legal norms against 
making legal distinctions or collective race-based data, limited 
studies by sociologists provide some evidence of racial disparities 
in France. 
 
B. Unemployment 
 
Sociologists estimate the unemployment rate in the heavily 
North African banlieues at about 40 percent.  First and second 
generation North African immigrants also typically confront 
failing schools, increased segregation, discrimination in hiring, 
everyday racism, police harassment, and increasing levels of 
 
115 See  22 Held for Riots in France, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2005. 
116 See Fabien Jobard, Sociologie politique de la « racaille », in EMEUTES 
URBAINES ET PROTESTATIONS : UNE SINGULARITE FRANÇAISE 59, 73 (Huges 
Lagrange & Marco Oberti eds. 2006). 
117 See, e.g., Laurent Muchielli & Véronique le Goaziou, Inégalités, 
Humiliations collectives et violences urbaines, in L’ETAT DES INEGALITES EN 
FRANCE 2007, at 199, 201 (ed. Louis Maurin & Patrick Savidan 2006). 
118 See infra notes __ 
Suk, Discrimination at Will 
 25
incarceration amongst young men in the banlieues.119 In reporting 
on the riots, the New York Times interviewed several immigrants in 
the banlieues who complained of discrimination in employment.  
One Kader, age 23, who said “On paper we’re all the same, but if 
your name is Mohamed, even with a good education, you can only 
find a job as a porter at the airport.”120 
It is undisputed that North African immigrants and French 
citizens of North African descent fare worse in their employment 
prospects than French citizens of European descent.   Because of 
the strong norms against collecting statistical data that classifies 
persons by race, class, and origin, the data supporting this 
conclusion is by no means comprehensive.  Nonetheless, the 
statistics that have been collected are consistent with the inference 
that, by most measures, persons of North African descent are 
disadvantaged in employment relative to other residents of France. 
 Some statistical data collected through voluntary surveys is 
available from the Institut national de la statistique et d’études 
économiques (INSEE, or National Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Studies), which produces an annual study of immigrants 
in France.  The most recent report concluded that, amongst persons 
between the ages of 25 and 59 years of North African, subsaharan 
African, or Turkish origin, the unemployment rate was 20%, 
approximately double the national unemployment rate.121 For 
immigrants from European countries, the unemployment rate was 
6.1%, which was lower than the unemployment rate for non-
immigrants, which was 7.2%.122 A 1999 survey studying the 
descendants of immigrants (ie second generation), the results did 
not vary significantly.  The unemployment rate for second-
generation Algerian men was 23.2 %, as compared with 10.1 
percent for French men born of two French-born parents.123 
INSEE also studied unemployment rates for foreign 
residents of France between the ages of 30 and 39.  It is not 
 
119 Stéphane Beaud & Michel Pialoux, La “racaille” et les “vrais jeunes”: 
critique d’une vision binaire du monde des cités, in BANLIEUE, LENDEMAN DE 
REVOLTE 17, 18-20 (ed. Chakri Belaïd 2006)  
120 Craig S. Smith, Angry Immigrants Embroil France in Wider Riots, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at A1. 
121 INSEE, Enquête emploi, 2002, table in LOUIS MAURIN & PATRICK SAVIDAN,
L’ETAT DES INEGALITES EN FRANCE 2007, at 95 (2006). 
122 Chloé Tavan, Les immigrés en France: une situation qui evolue, INSEE 
Première No. 1042, septembre 2005, at 3. 
123 INSEE, Enquête étude de l’histoire familiale, 1999. 
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surprising that the unemployment rate for all foreigners is, at 
23.7%, more than double the national unemployment rate.   But 
some foreigners do better than others.  The study shows that the 
unemployment rates for Algerians, Morroccoans, Tunisians, other 
nationalities of Africa, and Turks are 37.3%, 35.4%, 35.8%, 
36.8%, and 31.6% respectively.  Compare this to the 
unemployment rates for Spanish, Italian, Portuguese foreign 
residents in France, which are at 15.1%, 13.8%, and 10.1%.  
Foreigners of Vietnamese, Latian, and Combodian descent in this 
age group had an unemployment rate of 23.7%.124 
Another public research body, the Centre d’études et de 
recherches sur les qualifications (CEREQ), produced a study in 
2004 of young people who had finished their education and 
attempted to enter the workforce in 1998.  The data was compiled 
based entirely on voluntary responses to questionnaires 
administered by phone or mail to a random sampling of about a 
third of the 1.2 milliion young people entering the workforce.125 
Based on this data, statisticians have concluded that a French 
citizen of North African origin with a high school diploma was 1.6 
times more likely to be unemployed in the first three years after 
graduating than a French citizen with French parents and the 
equivalent educational qualification.126 
Historical data also support the conclusion that the 
employment gap between persons of North African descent and 
other French residents has gotten wider over the last several 
decades during which antidiscrimination law has been in effect.  
The unemployment rate for immigrants of North African origin has 
steadily increased over the last thirty years.  In the period from 
1975 to 1990, young North African men comprised between 9-
15% of all unemployed persons in 1975.127 In 1982, they 
constituted 19-38% of all unemployed persons, and in 1990, they 
constituted 34-45 % of all unemployed persons.128 Indeed, the 
 
124 INSEE, Enquête emploi, 2002, table in Louis Maurin & Patrick Savidan, 
L’état des inégalités en France 2007, at 95 (2006). 
125 Cereq, L’enquête Génération 98, Présentation de l’enquête, Questionnaire, at 
http://www.cereq.fr/cereq/G98ind/enquete.htm 
126 Cereq, Bref no. 205, Les jeunes issues de l’immigration: de l’enseignement 
supérieur au marché du travail, février 2004. 
127 Roxane Silberman, Les enfants d’immigrés sur le marché du travail, in FR.
HERAN (ED.), IMMIGRATION, MARCHE DU TRAVAIL, INTEGRATION 297, 301 
(2004). 
128 Id. 
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North African population in France has also grown since 1975, but 
today, persons of North African descent constitute less than 10 % 
of the population.  Thus, they are disproportionately represented 
amongst the unemployed population. 
 The difficulties faced by North Africans and blacks in 
finding employment were emphasized by French lawmakers in 
their response to the riots.129 The widespread joblessness explains 
why these young people have the time to engage in criminal 
activity, and also why this population is protesting, to the degree 
that the violence is understood as protest.   The wave of violence in 
November 2005 led the French government to adopt new laws on 
the “equality of opportunity”130 in response.  
 
C. How Job Security Protections Have Exacerbated 
Racial Inequality in France 
 
Although few French people are willing to say so 
explicitly, the data support the conclusion that French job security 
protections for all workers have, over time, exacerbated racial 
inequality and amplified employers’ incentives to discriminate 
against North Africans and other foreigners.   Over the last thirty 
years, French law has strengthened employee job security 
protection.  Reforms have sometimes included measures to make 
the employment discrimination prohibition more effective, if 
prompted by an EU directive.131 Nonetheless, racial inequality in 
access to employment has worsened. 
 Between 1974 and 1986, the national unemployment rate 
grew from 3 percent to 11 percent.132 For the last twenty years, 
unemployment has hovered around 10 percent.133 Of those who 
are unemployed, many suffer from long-term unemployment, 
defined as a bout of joblessness of one year.  Between 1985 and 
 
129 Assemblée Nationale, Rapport No 2825, fait au nom de la commission des 
affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales sur le projet de loi no 2787 pour 
l’égalité des chances, par M. Laurent Hénart, Député, 25 janvier 2006, at 7. 
130 Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances, JORF du 2 
avril 2006, at 4950 
131 Loi no. 2001-1066 du 16 novembre 2001 relative à la lutte contre les 
discriminations, J.O.R.F., 17 novembre 2001. 
132 Jonah D. Levy, France: Directing Adjustment? in FRITZ SCHARPF & VIVIEN 
SCHMIDT, EDS., WELFARE AND WORK IN THE OPEN ECONOMY: DIVERSE 
RESPONSES TO COMMON CHALLENGES (2000), vol. II, at 308. 
133 Smith at 9. 
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1995, more then twenty percent of the unemployed were jobless 
for more than two years. 
 During the “trente glorieuses,” the thirty “glory” years of 
economic growth in France from 1945-1975, the France enjoyed a 
full-employment economy.  In the 1960s, for instance, the 
unemployment rate was under 2 percent,134 and the entry of guest 
workers and immigrants was encouraged to keep up with the pace 
of economic growth.135 Immigrants, since they entered France as 
guestworkers to fill the demand for labor, were employed during 
the 1960s 
 From1974-1981, unemployment rose from 3 percent to 7 
percent, and from 1981 to 1986, it grew to 11 percent.136 
Historians and economists have devoted a wealth of literature to 
exploring the causes of the growth of unemployment in France 
during this period.137 
A recent OECD study observes that employee protection 
legislation has played a significant role in keeping unemployment 
levels high in France.138 Under the Labor Code’s regulations that 
ensure the employment contracts are not terminable at will, firing 
an employee, even an unproductive employee, is extremely costly 
for the employer.139 With the exception of “serious fault,” even 
terminations for economic reasons or just cause, which are 
permissible under the Code, cost the employer procedural costs 
and severance payments.  A 1995 study shows that employers lose 
 
134 Id. at 75-76. 
135 See PATRICK WEIL, LA FRANCE ET SES IMMIGRÉS  (2005). 
136 Jonah D. Levy, supra note __, at  
137 See, e.g., E. Milinvaud, The Rise of Unemployment in France, 53 
ECONOMICA S197  (1986) (focusing on depression of demand facing French 
firms since 1973); Gerard J. Van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours, Unemployment 
Dynamics and Duration Dependence in France, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom, 104 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 432 (1994) (focusing on the dynamic 
between personal characteristics and stigma in long-term unemployment); 
TIMOTHY SMITH, FRANCE IN CRISIS (2003) (focusing on pension and minimum 
wage regulation as causes of unemployment); Olivier Blanchard & Justin 
Wolfers, The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European 
Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence, 110 ECONOMIC JOURNAL C1 (2000) 
(comparing explanations that focus on the role of economic shocks to 
explanations that focus on the role of adverse market institutions). 
138 Stéphanie Jamet, Improving Labour Market Performance in France, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Economics 
Department Working Paper, July 24, 2006, at 12. 
139 See PHILIP H. GORDON & SOPHIE MEUNIER, THE FRENCH CHALLENGE:
ADAPTING TO GLOBALIZATION 35 (2001). 
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74% of litigated wrongful termination cases in France (as 
compared with 48% in Canada, 51 % in Italy, and 38% in Great 
Britain).140 One economic study estimates the marginal cost of 
terminating one worker at 14 months’ wages of a median wage 
worker.141 
As a result, employers rarely create new jobs in France, 
leaving very few positions open to young people attempting to 
enter the labor market. Throughout the 1990s, 50 percent of the 
unemployed were young people, between the ages of twenty-one to 
thirty.142 This problem was often discussed in debates about the 
CPE. French business leaders claimed that they would hire more 
people if it were not so costly to lay off an employee.143 Without 
the severance pay obligations under the Labor Code, a business 
could take more risks, and hire more people than absolutely 
necessary without taking into account firing costs if the business 
does not meet its projected targets.144 
Even if the job security laws are not the primary or 
exclusive cause of the high levels of youth unemployment in 
France, any evaluation of the job security laws from the 
perspective of racial equality has to consider the high French 
unemployment rate, at around 10%, as given.  In the context of 
such a high and constant (20 years and counting) unemployment 
rate, job security laws have had a disproportionate adverse impact 
on racial minorities. The increased costs of termination affect the 
ways in which employers exercise their discretion in hiring.  An 
employer knowing how costly it will be to fire a full-time 
employee is less likely to hire candidates whom they consider risky 
hires.  This leads to both “rational” and racially biased failures to 
hire racial minorities. 
 When unemployment is high, employers find it easier to 
find white males to substitute for minorities a slack labor market, 
 
140 Giuseppe Bertola, Tito Boeri & Sandrine Cazes, Employment Protection in 
Industrialized Countries: The Case for New Indicators, 139 INT’L LAB. REV. 57, 
67 (2000). 
141 Francis Kramarz & Marie-Laure Michaud, The Shape of Hiring and 
Separation Costs, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper No. 
1170, June 2004, at 15, manuscript available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp1170.html. 
142 Smith, supra note __, at 10-12. 
143 See Rachel Tiplady, Job Security Ignites Debate in France, BUSINESS WEEK 
Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com 
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since there will be an abundance of qualified whites available for 
the job.145 The inability to fire someone without “just cause” will 
lead employers to be more selective in hiring, and selectivity will 
be higher when the ratio of candidates to available positions is high 
– which is inevitable when unemployment rates are high.  Higher 
selectivity increases the opportunities for two types of employer 
decisions that undermine minorities’ access to employment. 
 
1.  Merit-Based Failures to Hire. Increased selectivity 
makes it far more difficult for persons with fewer qualifications 
(such as education, diplomas, experience) to be hired.  When an 
employer In a society where residential segregation has resulted in 
a correlation between membership in a minority group and 
educational achievement, racial minorities will be disadvantaged 
by increased selectivity in hiring processes.  As a result of patterns 
of residential segregation and their social consequences, young 
people of North African descent are disproportionately less 
qualified for employment than others.  Persons of North African 
descent are concentrated in particular banlieus, as a result of 
French housing policies over the last thirty years.  Many North 
Africans arrived in France in the 1960s as temporary workers, and 
were thus housed in publicly funded housing projects separately 
from French nationals in the public housing system.146 
Furthermore, housing discrimination in the private sector made it 
difficult for visible minorities to find housing outside of the public 
sector.147 As a result, many North Africans have remained in 
public housing in the banlieues.  As many industrial enterprises 
reduced their workforce by 40% between 1975-1990, the 
unemployment rates in the banlieues rose significantly.148 
145 See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: 
Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 709, 723 (1995).  Donohue and Siegelman claim that slack labor markets 
make it cheaper for employers with discriminatory tastes to “indulge their 
preference” for white workers.  While I agree with Donohue and Siegelman on 
this point, I argue further that slack labor markets not only create incentives for 
such indulgences in irrational discriminatory “tastes,” but also that slack labor 
markets create more opportunities for rational discrimination. 
146 See YAZID SABEG & LAURENCE MEHAIGNERIE, LES OUBLIES DE L’EGALITE 
DES CHANCES (2006). 
147 See YAZID SABEG & LAURENCE MEHAIGNERIE, LES OUBLIES DE L’EGALITE 
DES CHANCES 199 (2006). 
148 Id. at 197. 
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The residential segregation has led to educational 
segregation.  In the “zones urbaines sensibles” (ZUS), or “urban 
sensitive zones,” which were designated based on socio-economic 
indicators in 1981, there are larger percentages of students who are 
left behind, and lower percentages of students succeeding in the 
national diploma relative to the French average.149 National 
education statistics indicate a 10 point gap in sixth-grade 
standardized tests in average scores (on a 100-point scale) between 
students with two immigrant parents as contrasted to students with 
two French-born parents.150 Only 46.9% of the children of 
immigrants finish the Baccalauréat (Bac), the high school diploma 
necessary to advance to university education, as contrasted with 
63.7% of children with French nationality.   One study indicates 
that 31 percent of youth from a recent immigrant background exits 
the education system without a diploma of any kind, as compared 
to 14 percent of French-born youths.151 
Young people of North African origin in the banlieues have 
difficulty finding employment, due in significant part to their lack 
of educational success. A 2004 report indicates that, for persons 
under the age of 25 years, the national unemployment rate is 23 
percent, but in the ZUS, the unemployment rate for persons in this 
age group is 38 percent.152 The youth unemployment rate in 
France is so high that competition for every available job is fierce. 
A young person’s employment prospects are directly correlated to 
his or her educational background.  A 2003 INSEE study of 
persons 15-29 years of age (excluding those continuing their 
education) indicates that 59.9% of persons with a Bac or 
equivalent are employed in contracts of indeterminate duration, as 
compared with 42.7% of persons without any diploma.153 72.2% 
 
149 See Assemblée Nationale, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires 
culturelles, familiales, et sociales sur le projet de loi pour l’égalité des chances, 
par M. Laurent Hénart, 25 janvier 2006, at 14-15. 
150 Education Nationale, panel 1995 et évaluations nationales à l’entrée en 6e. 
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Rapport, June 2003, at 10. 
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of persons in this age group with a Bac plus 2 more years of 
education have such jobs. 
 
2.  Racially Biased Failures to Hire.  Furthermore, the 
increased selectivity of a hiring process is likely to amplify the 
workings of irrational racial bias.  “Just cause” means that you 
can’t fire someone for arbitrary reasons – you can’t fire someone 
simply because you personally find him annoying, awkward, or 
humorless.  This will heighten the employer’s mechanisms for 
avoiding a bad choice. When the number of qualified applicants 
for a job is high, the employer has incentives to use irrational 
proxies, such as racial stereotypes, as a basis for excluding some of 
the candidates.  
Forcing employers into a lifelong commitment with anyone 
they hire makes the initial hiring decision more and more like 
choosing a marriage partner or adoptive family member.  It is 
reasonable to conclude that, particularly in a high-unemployment 
labor market, in which there are far more qualified applicants than 
there are positions, this dynamic will disadvantage those who seem  
less familiar, more foreign, or culturally different.154 Racial bias, 
not only against disfavored groups, but also in favor of those most 
like oneself, excludes minorities.  The bias may be overt and 
conscious or implicit and unconscious.  Either way, minorities 
lose. 
 This hypothesis is consistent with some available data with 
regard to hiring discrimination.   Organizations like SOS-Racisme 
and Observatoire des discriminations have conducted various 
“testing” operations whereby a job candidate sends an identical 
CV, one bearing an Arab name and address in a banlieue and 
another bearing a traditional French name and address in a 
respectable Parisian neighborhood.155 In many of these studies, the 
Arab name resume is rejected without an interview, whereas the 
 
154 British scholars and policy-makers have long recognized that women and 
minorities are disadvantaged when people in power unconsciously give more 
favorable treatment to persons of the same social, cultural, or religious 
background as themselves because they feel more comfortable with them.  See 
BOB HEPPLE, MARY COUSSEY, & TUYFAL CHOUDHURY, EQUALITY: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
UK ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 15 (2000). 
155 Jean-François Amadieu, Enquête, available at http://cergors.Univ-paris1.fr.
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French name resume is invited for an interview.156 In one study, 
researchers sent two identical CVs to 258 employers, with the only 
difference between the two CVs being the name of the candidate.  
One CV bore a “traditional” French first and last name, whereas 
the other bore a North African first and last name.  The first CV 
received 75 requests for an interview, whereas the second received 
14.157 This study demonstrates the persistence of racial bias 
amongst employers.  The CVs listed the same address for both 
names.    
Sociologists are now only beginning to collect qualitative 
interview data describing the experience of racial minorities in 
various aspects of employment.158 A young person of North 
African descent reported that despite his having obtained a 
baccalaureate and a master’s degree in psychology, he was having 
difficulty finding an internship necessary to become a 
psychologist.  He reported: 
I do not want to be a pessimist, but to have the 
qualification “bac plus five” and to be unemployed . 
. .
The problem is the basic problem, that is, today, if 
you are Maghrebin it’s hard to find a position.  
They make you feel when you are interviewed, that 
it’s just a formality, or, I don’t know what, but they 
make you feel that way.  You go through the 
interview, and they tell you they’ll call you back, 
but in the end they never call you back.  My letters 
remain without response, maybe it’s because of my 
name but I don’t know.  I don’t know if this is 
discrimination, but it is a problem. . . . There is no 
room for foreigners, and when they take you, it’s to 
clean behind a bar, where they can’t see you!159 
In other contexts, such as hiring for the police force, 
sociologists have studied the pervasiveness of racial stereotyping.  
 
156 Samuel Thomas, Rapport d’Analyse des affaires récentes de discriminations 
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For instance, candidates of North African origin report being asked 
what they would do if their brother were arrested.160 In a 
supermarket, one Algerian employee has reported racial 
segregation – the placement of Algerians away from cash registers 
and in the stocking areas, where they are hidden from customers’ 
view.161 
In an economy with such high rates of unemployment 
amongst the young, employers are overwhelmed with job 
applications for every available position.  This increases the 
discretionary power of the employer in hiring; the employer must 
find ways of distinguishing desirable from undesirable 
applicants.162 These decisions cannot rest solely on qualifications, 
since there are more qualified applicants than there are positions.  
Thus, the opportunity to consider other characteristics that do not 
bear on one’s ability to perform the job is amplified.  Even if the 
employer does not refuse to hire a candidate on the basis of their 
race, an employer can easily end up failing to hire minority 
candidates as a result of choosing candidates with whom they seem 
to “fit” better.    
 
IV. The Rejected Solutions 
 
A. The Law on the Equality of Opportunities 
 
Consistent with the universalistic approach to policies that 
are intended to ameliorate the dismal situation of North African 
immigrants in the banlieues, the legislative response to the 2005 
race riots was framed in universal, rather than race-conscious, 
terms.  The statute, styled “Law on the Equality of Opportunities,” 
included various race-neutral provisions that were intended to 
combat the disadvantages faced by the residents of the banlieues, 
many of whom are second-generation immigrant citizens of the 
French republic. 
 The statute was presented as a response to the urban 
violence: 
 
160 SOPHIE BODY-GENDROT & CATHERINE WIHTOL DE WENDEN, POLICE ET 
DISCRIMINATION RACIALES (2003) 
161 VERONIQUE DE RUDDER, CHRISTIAN POIRET, & FRANÇOIS VOURC’H,
L’INEGALITE RACISTE 142 (2000). 
162 SMITH, supra note __, at 178. 
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The crisis that came upon certain quarters of our 
cities were a revelation.  That which we knew, but 
at times did not want to see, appeared clearly.  
These quarters could seem like the low point of all 
the evils of French society: massive failures in the 
education system, at times the lack of natural 
authority which should be that of the parents, 
unemployment, instability, shocking discrimination 
. . . 163 
The November riots were seen as a reaction to lack of educational 
opportunity and unemployment in the suburbs, in addition to 
discrimination.  But the legislative response mostly attempted to 
improve education and employment opportunities in the suburbs 
without framing the lack of such opportunities as caused by racism 
or discrimination.164 This legislative response is also 
representative of the French tendency to universalize the solution 
to problems of race discrimination. 
In addition to providing incentives to employers to hire 
more young people from the disadvantaged zones, the Equality of 
Opportunities statute attempted to limit the hiring discretion of 
employers.  Another provision required employers of a certain size 
to accept anonymous CVs at the initial stages of a hiring process.  
Article 24 of provides that, in enterprises of more than 50 
employees, information requested of job candidates must be 
presented in a way that preserves the anonymity of the 
candidate.165 
163 The French text reads : 
La crise qu’ont traversée cet automne certains des quartiers de 
nos villes a agi comme un révélateur.  Ce que nous savions, 
mais parfois ne voulions pas voir, est apparu clairement.  Ces 
quartiers peuvent appraître comme le précipité de tous les 
maux de la société française : décrochages massifs du système 
scolaire, parfois carence de l’autorité naturelle qui doit être 
celle des parents, chômage, précarité, discriminations 
choquantes . . . 
Assemblée Nationale, Rapport No 2825, fait au nom de la commission des 
affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales sur le projet de loi no 2787 pour 
l’égalité des chances, par M. Laurent Hénart, Député, 25 janvier 2006, at 7. 
164 Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances, JORF du 2 
avril 2006, at 4950 
165 Id., art. 24.   
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At the same time, the statute increased the discretion of 
employers with regard to termination, in a provision that proved 
too unpopular to be sustained.  Article 8 of the statute created a 
new form of employment contract, the “contrat première 
embauche,” (CPE) or first employment contract, which could be 
terminated at the will of either party without just cause in the first 
two years of employment.166 After the first two years, the contract 
would become a contract for an unspecified period, governed by 
the Labor Code’s strong job security protections.  Only employers 
with 20 or more employees could enter into these contracts, which 
were limited to employees under the age of 26 years and entering 
into their first job.  An employer could terminate the CPE without 
incurring normal obligations under the Labor Code’s job security 
protections. 
 
B. Student Strikes and Employment At Will 
 
After the Equality of Opportunities law was adopted, over a 
million young people took to the streets to protest the CPE.  The 
protesters consisted mainly of university students from middle-
class backgrounds. According to one sociologist, there was little 
geographical overlap between the March protests against the CPE 
and the November 2005 protests.167 
The opponents of the CPE saw the provision as the 
beginning of the end, a symbolic first step towards the dismantling 
of the Labor Code’s protections of employee job security and the 
egalitarian republican values for which they stood.  The CPE 
validated unstable employment, which many young people 
rejected.  The very notion that an employee could work for two 
years and then be fired for no reason, without the normal severance 
pay was, for the movement’s leaders, “scandalous.”168 They 
predicted that this would lead employers to replace those hired 
 
166 Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances (1), art. 8, 
JORF du 2 avril 2006, at __. 
167 Hugues Lagranges & Marco Oberti, Le mouvement anti-CPE et l’unité des 
jeunes, in EMEUTES URBAINES ET PROTESTATIONS: UNE SINGULARITE FRANÇAISE 
131, 139 (2006). 
168 See Que veulent les lycéens anti-CPE?  (Interview with Tristan Rouquier, 
president of the Independent and Democratic Federation of High School 
Students), Le Monde, March 17, 2006. 
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with new CPE employees every two years,169 instead of retaining 
the CPE employee after two years as a permanent employee 
protected by the Labor Code.  They rejected the premise that the 
CPE would create more jobs, and predicted that jobs that might 
otherwise be contracts of unspecified duration (with all the 
ordinary protections of the Labor Code) would become CPE jobs, 
simply increasing the percentage of French workers with 
precarious employment without creating more jobs. 
They were probably right on the latter prediction.  The CPE 
would have created more jobs from which employees could easily 
be terminated, and fewer jobs in which employees enjoyed the 
extensive job security protections.  This development would have 
benefited the least advantaged, least qualified employment 
candidates in the population, those who are considered too risky to 
be hired immediately into lifelong positions.  It would have created 
more points of entry into the labor market, which gives 
opportunities to more people, while giving long-term security to 
fewer people. 
Ultimately, the social movement against the CPE prevailed.  
After protests that turned violent, and strikes that disrupted 
schools, universities, post offices, banks, government offices, and 
transportation, Chirac eventually repealed the unpopular provision. 
The legislature went back to the drawing board, and in late April, 
adopted a new law on the “access of young people to active life in 
enterprises.”170 
C. The Anonymous CV and Incentives to Promote 
Minority Hiring 
 
The most interesting consequence of these controversies is 
that, once the Government withdrew the CPE provision, employers 
became increasingly vocal against the anonymous CV provision of 
the Equal Opportunities law.   In October 2006, the government 
announced recently, however, that the anonymous CV rule would 
not be enforced due to resistance from enterprises.171 
169 See CPE: Les arguments contre (Interview with Bruno Juilliard, President of 
the National Union of Students of France) Le Monde, March 2, 2006. 
170 Loi no. 2006-457 du 21 avril 2006 sur l’accès des jeunes à la vie active en 
entreprise, JORF du 22 avril 2006. 
171 Michel Delbherghe, Le CV anonyme ne sera pas obligatoire dans les 
entreprises, Le Monde, 13 octobre 2006. 
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After the CPE provision was repealed, a new version of the 
law, adopted in April 2006, provided that employers would receive 
a subsidy from the state for entering into employment contracts to 
specific classes of disadvantaged persons: (1) young people 
between 16 and 25 whose level of education is inferior to that of a 
second-cycle diploma (equivalent to bachelor’s degree in the 
United States): (2) young people of the same age group residing in 
urban sensitive zones; or (3) young people who are in a “contract 
of insertion in social life” with the state.172 The “contract of 
insertion in social life” refers to a state program for young people 
between 15 and 25 years of age who are having difficulties in 
social and professional integration.  Participants in the program are 
provided with the assistance of a local state agency in finding a 
job, professional training, specific measures to address difficulties, 
and assistance in the job search.173 
The new law provides incentives for employers who 
voluntarily recruit young people from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
A parallel can be drawn to U.S. policies of requiring companies 
contracting with the federal government to adopt affirmative action 
programs.  It remains to be seen, however, whether this provision 
will actually increase minority hiring in a world where every 
employee, once hired, is legally guaranteed job security.  In light 
of employers’ resistance to the seemingly innocuous proposal that 
they require the anonymous of CVs from job applicants, the 
outlook is not optimistic. 
 
V. The Political Economy of Employment Discrimination 
 
A. French Lessons: Comparative Method 
 
What are the lessons for the American law of equal 
employment opportunity?  There are obviously significant 
differences in history, legal institutions, culture, racial and ethnic 
minorities between France and the United States.  I have explored  
these in more detail elsewhere,174 and concluded that these 
 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal By Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2007); Julie Chi-hye 
Suk, The French Disadvantage in Employment Discrimination: The Limits of 
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differences cast doubt on the applicability of mutual lessons.175 
Understanding what went wrong in France for racial inequality 
does not give us perfect, or even reliable information about what 
will go wrong in the United States.  But a comparative perspective 
can unsettle our basic intuitions about the relationship of job 
security protections to racial equality.  Doing so brings into sharper 
focus the new problems that can come into play as a result of 
reforming employment law.  These problems may undermine the 
goals of employment discrimination law in different ways that at 
will employment does.  Such possibilities must be understood by 
those interested in fixing the inadequacies of Title VII. 
 American lawyers and scholars tend to focus on the 
problems raised by the litigation of discrimination cases – 
including barriers to judgment for plaintiffs and employer 
incentives generated by the threat of litigation – rather than on the 
broader political economy of employment.  Examining the 
relationship between job security protection and the 
disproportionately high levels of racial-minority unemployment in 
France enables the American observer to see the big picture, 
beyond these litigation-centered concerns, more clearly.176 It may 
 
Civil Procedure and the Consequences of Criminalization (manuscript on file 
with author). 
175 Traditional comparative method has looked to foreign law as a source of 
models that can be imported to solve presumably similar problems.  See, e.g.,
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 94-95 (1993) (arguing that transplanting 
is a fertile source of legal development); ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO COMPARATIVE LAW (TONY WEIR TRANS. 3D ED. 1998) (same); James 
Gordley, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of 
Harmonized Law, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 555, 560 (1995) (arguing that many legal 
problems are conceptually the same wherever they arise, thereby calling for 
transnational inquiry). Scholars have recently critiqued the notion that 
comparative law should search for transplantable models. See, e.g., William 
Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try A Rat?, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1890, 1896 (1995) (criticizing the “legal transplant” approach); 
Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 517, 523 (2006) 
(noting that law always works in a particular local context).   
176 In arguing that the French experience can be instructive for American 
employment law and equal opportunity, I do not suggest that the disasters that 
have befallen France as a result of its choices with regard to job security 
protection will also plague the United States if we, too, adopt such norms.  
Rather, it is my hope that observing the dynamics and tensions between job 
security protection and the failing struggle to achieve racial equality in France 
will sharpen the critical perspective and imagination that American lawyers 
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be easier for the American lawyer to notice the tension between 
employee job security protections and racial equality in a foreign 
context rather than in one’s own country, largely because one is 
more removed from the political consequences of noticing such 
problems outside of one’s own borders.177 
The consequences of universal employee job security 
protections for equal employment opportunity in France highlight 
the dynamic between limitations on employer firing discretion and 
hiring behavior that disadvantages minorities.  Comparing the 
limitations on employer discretion in hiring and firing in two 
national contexts can help illuminate this dynamic.  This dynamic 
is central to the political economy of employment discrimination, 
which is also affected by residential segregation, inequities in 
education, and the general unemployment rate.   
 
B. The Persistence of Hiring Discrimination 
 By treating the prohibition of discrimination in 
employment as an element of a larger package of employee job 
security protections,178 French law has paid insufficient attention to 
the main site of employment discrimination: employers’ exercise 
of wide discretion in hiring decisions.  Granted, both the Penal and 
Labor Codes formally prohibit discrimination in recruitment and 
hiring.179 But most of the Labor Code’s extensive regulation of 
employer discretion, such as the imposition and regulatory 
enforcement of detailed termination procedures, govern the 
employment contract itself.  Outside of the contract, the Labor 
Code limits employer discretion in hiring only by prohibiting 
 
bring to their attempts to achieve racial equality through law in the United 
States.   
177 As Robert Kagan has astutely noted, the relevant medical metaphor should 
not be transplant, but psychotherapy.  Like psychotherapy, Kagan notes, 
“comparative analysis attempts to reveal roads not taken, unconsciously 
maintained patterns, and sources of resistance to change, thereby encouraging 
new courses of action that build on existing resources and potentials.  ROBERT 
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 5-6 (2001). 
178 See supra, Part II. 
179 Section 225-2 of the Penal Code prohibits, inter alia, the refusal to hire a 
person on the basis of the prohibited characteristics in Section 225-1.  See C. 
PÉN. L. 225-2 (2006).  Section 122-45 of the Labor Code provides, inter alia, 
“that no person can be excluded from a recruitment process or from access to an 
internship or a period of training in an enterprise” on the basis of any of any of 
the prohibited characteristics, which include race, origin, sex, and many other 
categories.  C. Trav. L. 122-45 (2006). 
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certain types of employment contracts (such as temporary contracts 
for the ordinary work of the enterprise) and through a general 
prohibition of discriminatory recruitment and hiring which is 
enforced through private civil lawsuits or, for the parallel criminal 
provision, through prosecution. 
 These formal prohibitions of discriminatory hiring have no 
deterrent effect in France.  The reality is that employers clearly 
discriminate against candidates of North African descent, resulting 
in this population’s disproportionately high levels of 
unemployment.180 The persistence of discrimination in hiring, 
despite the formal legal prohibition of such conduct, is explained 
by barriers to the effective enforcement of this prohibition in 
French criminal and civil procedure.  In short, convictions for 
discriminatory hiring under the Penal Code are rare due to the 
intent requirement and burden of proof for criminal liability, and 
employers are rarely found civilly liable for discriminatory hiring 
because the lack of discovery in French civil procedure makes it 
nearly impossible for plaintiffs to prove even the most basic facts 
that could give rise to an inference of discrimination. 181 Most 
discrimination cases are brought in criminal proceedings, and 
convictions are very rare.  Antidiscrimination law hardly deters 
even the most overt forms of discrimination. 
By comparison with France, the civil litigation under Title 
VII has been very effective in deterring overt discrimination.  In 
the first two years of Title VII enforcement, EEOC charges based 
on hiring discrimination allegations outnumbered termination 
charges by 50 percent.182 Any employer who failed to hire 
qualified blacks in the late 1960s or early 1970s would probably 
have faced a class-action lawsuit.183 Overt forms of 
discrimination, such as a systematic refusal to hire blacks, were 
likely to produce plaintiff victories at the time, in light of the 
widespread understanding that the purpose of the statute was to 
combat these forms of discrimination in recruitment and hiring.184 
As Donohue and Siegelman observe:  “A rational employer in 
 
180 See supra, Part IV. 
181 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, The French Disadvantage in Employment 
Discrimination: The Limits of Civil Procedure and the Consequences of 
Criminalization (manuscript on file with author). 
182 John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991). 
183 Id. at 1027-28. 
184 Id. at 1031-32. 
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1965 need not have waited until he was actually sued to change his 
employment practices.  Thus, the mere threat of litigation would 
probably have induced an employer to change his behavior.”185 
The threat of litigation for overtly discriminating, either at the 
hiring or firing stage, has effectively driven out discriminatory 
behavior by employers in which the racially discriminatory motive 
is apparent. 
But many American scholars note that most of the 
behaviors that cause inequality in the workplace today can be 
attributed to implicit bias rather than the overt manifestation of 
racial bias that Title VII litigation can effectively remedy and 
deter.186 The current high ratio Title VII firing cases relative to 
hiring cases does not necessarily support the inference that firing 
discrimination is more common than hiring discrimination.187 
Rather, employers continue to engage in a variety of subtle 
practices that undermine racial minorities’ access to good jobs.  As 
Linda Hamilton Krieger has shown, the cognitive processes that 
lead employers to discriminate are automatic; they use 
“stereotypes, scripts, and schemas” to interpret information 
 
185 Id. at 1032. 
186 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CAL. L. REV. (2006); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: 
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 91, 95-111 (2003), Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1211 (1995); Reva B. 
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136-37 (1997); Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458-74 (2001). 
187 While it is clear that employers faced a real threat of liability for overtly 
discriminating against African Americans right after Title VII was passed, 
recent studies suggest that the threat of liability today is more limited.  Michael 
Selmi, for instance, shows in an empirical study of class action employment 
discrimination litigation that these lawsuits do not substantially influence stock 
prices.  These cases are usually settled, and these settlements do not significantly 
harm firm value.  See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature 
of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1249, 1267-68 (2003).  
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relevant to social, judgments188 including judgments about who is 
the ideal candidate for a given job. Title VII has effectively driven 
out obvious and overt discrimination,189 but subtler forms of hiring 
discrimination that are difficult to prove in civil litigation persist in 
the United States.190 Many scholars have criticized Title VII for its 
inability to deter or remedy the subtler forms of discrimination. 
 
C. Firing Discretion and the Migration of Discriminatory 
Tendencies 
 
The French experience shows that a general limitation on 
the employer’s firing discretion, by way of job security 
protections, can magnify employers’ tendencies to discriminate in 
hiring.  In other words, general constraints on employers’ firing 
discretion cause racial bias to migrate from firing decisions to the 
hiring decisions.  This dynamic is similar to the dynamic discussed 
by Posner, Donohue, Siegelman, and Ayres, by which Title VII’s 
regulation of discriminatory firing effectively imposes a “tax” on 
minority hiring.  In the United States, limiting employers’ firing 
discretion may not increase the incidence of overt hiring 
discrimination, given how effective Title VII is at deterring overt 
discrimination.  But strong limitations on employers’ firing 
discretion, by way of job security protection, can increase the 
likelihood that racial bias, both conscious and implicit, will be 
manifested in an employment decision.  In France, this means that, 
since discretion over firing is virtually nonexistent, all of the 
employers’ discriminatory tendencies migrate to the exercise of 
hiring discretion.  When a law limits employers’ discretion over 
firing broadly, as applied to every employee, the law does not 
eradicate the discriminatory tendency: it simply moves 
 
188 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1239 (1995). 
189 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note __, at __. 
190 Nonetheless, Christine Jolls argues that antidiscrimination law has had the 
effect of decreasing implicit bias.  Jolls argues that, to the extent that 
antidiscrimination law has increased the presence of minorities in the workplace, 
implicit bias has been decreased.  She reaches this conclusion by citing to social 
science literature establishing that the presence of minorities decreases the level 
of implicit racial bias exhibited by others.  See Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination Law’s Effect on Implicit Bias, in Behavioral Analyses of 
Workplace Discrimination (forthcoming). 
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discrimination to decisions over which employers retain discretion, 
namely hiring decisions. 
In the United States, Title VII’s success in driving out overt 
discrimination has not extinguished discriminatory tendencies.  
Rather, racial bias has morphed and migrated.191 Now, it is 
manifested in more subtle forms of employer conduct, both at the 
hiring stage and at the firing stage (and in between).  Tot he extent 
that freedom of contract gives employers discretion over hiring, 
employers can exercise it in ways that manifest racial bias without 
the overtness often needed as a practical matter to establish a Title 
VII violation in a litigated case.  And, to the extent that 
employment at will gives employers broad latitude to fire, 
employers can exercise that discretion in ways that manifest racial 
bias without generating the direct evidence often needed as a 
practical matter to establish a Title VII violation after the Hicks 
line of cases.  To sum up:  in neither country does employment law 
eradicate racial bias.  Rather, the law functions to move racial bias 
to the employment decision over which employers legally exercise 
the greatest degree of discretion.  In France, it’s the hiring 
decision.  In the United States, it’s the firing decision. 
Furthermore, subtle forms of hiring discrimination persist 
in the United States, even though hiring discrimination is not 
litigated as frequently as firing discrimination.  Existing empirical 
data192 support the conclusion that implicit racial bias continues 
affect employers’ exercise of hiring discretion in the United States.  
A recent Chicago study establishing that, when identical resumes 
are sent to employers with African American and white sounding 
names, white names receive 50 percent more callbacks than 
African American ones.193 Another study, by Devah Pager, 
 
191 The morphing of discrimination that I describe is a variant of what Reva 
Siegel has called “preservation-through-transformation.”  Siegel argues that 
status-enforcing state action evolves as it is regulated by law and contested.  See 
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).  Similarly, 
employment discrimination evolves in response to the way law proscribes 
certain employment practices. 
192 For a good discussion of the methodology and limits of some of these 
empirical studies, see John J. Donohue, The Law and Economics of 
Antidiscrimination Law, at 38-44, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=763486, 
193 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, NBER Working Paper, at 12, available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/papers/emilygreg.pdf. 
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demonstrates that hiring discrimination against blacks is so great 
that a black applicant without a criminal record has the same 
chance of success as a white applicant with a criminal record.194 
Many other audit-pair studies, in which the testers were trained to 
exhibit similar personal characteristics, also establish that whites 
are more likely than blacks with the same qualifications to be 
offered interviews or jobs.195 
Imagine these employers making hiring decisions in a legal 
regime that prohibits them from terminating any employee except 
for cause. Increasing employers’ risk-aversion in hiring can also 
exacerbate irrational discrimination.  The knowledge that it will be 
difficult to fire anybody who is hired creates incentives for 
employers to pick people with whom he feels comfortable and 
familiar. The potential for a lifetime relationship drives up the 
significance of solidarity, trust, and loyalty. This strengthens the 
reliance on stereotypes, scripts, and schemas in choosing 
employees.   
The historical experience of internal job markets in the 
United States is instructive.  In the United States, prior to the 
1970s, many employees enjoyed job security, even in an at-will 
legal regime, because their employers observed the social norm of 
promising lifetime employment, in firms that were structured to 
enable employees to move up the ladder at the same firm 
throughout their careers.  Women were not hired by large 
corporations with internal labor markets, largely because 
employers assumed that women would quit or disrupt their 
progress up the job ladder to have children.196 Internal labor 
markets also excluded black employees.197 Promises of job 
security were often obtained when unions negotiated for them with 
employers, and unions excluded or segregated on the basis of race. 
The forms of solidarity and trust associated with lifetime 
employment and job security protection may sharpen an 
employer’s tendency to avoid hiring persons who, by stereotype 
and scheme, seem like outsiders.  
 
194 Devah Pager, The Mark of  A Criminal Record, 108 Am. J. Sociology 937 
(2003). 
195 W.A. Darity & P. L. Mason, Evidence of Discrimination in Employment: 
Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 63 (1998). 
196 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 161 (2004). 
197 Id. at 163. 
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Moreover, in the absence of the liberty to terminate at will, 
one can reasonably predict that employers will be reluctant to 
practice voluntary affirmative action in hiring to the same extent as 
they do the at-will world. Affirmative action is a form of risk-
taking.  It also plays an important role in integrating the American 
workplace,198 which could easily be eroded by a for-cause regime.   
The French employers’ resistance to the anonymous CV rule is 
telling.  While the provision was passed as part of the statutory 
package that included the employment at-will provision, resistance 
to the anonymous CV provision grew after the student movements 
buried employment at will.  Surely this is not a mere coincidence.  
Although racial inequality in the United States is different 
in various respects from the situation in France, one similarity that 
should not be overlooked is the high level of residential 
segregation that has led to low levels of educational achievement 
amongst African Americans.199 The rational employer will 
naturally be more risk-averse, knowing that it will be extremely 
difficult and costly to fire someone once hired.  The difficulty of 
firing will strengthen the desire to avoid hiring persons with fewer 
educational credentials.  To the extent that the black-white gap in 
education remains a reality in the United States, this dynamic can 
work to the disadvantage of blacks.  Therefore, in the U.S. context, 
a for-cause regime can exacerbate a whole range of discriminatory 
tendencies in hiring.       
 
VI. Rethinking Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
 
The French experience highlights two important lessons:  
First, it highlights the need for equal employment opportunity law 
to manage the manifestations of racial bias that it is unable to 
eradicate.  Second, it provides a concrete example of the limits of 
race-neutral universalistic approaches to addressing racial 
discrimination in employment.   
 
A.  The Management of Racial Bias 
 
198 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER, supra note __, at 147. 
199 See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).  This sociological 
study documents the persistence of residential segregation in the United States, 
which has undermined African Americans’ social mobility. 
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Racial bias, of both the overt and implicit varieties, tends to 
express itself in the employment decisions over which employers 
retain discretion.  Both job security laws and employment 
discrimination laws impose limits on employer discretion. In so 
doing, they push the racial bias into the remaining areas of 
discretion.  In both countries, employer hiring decisions remain 
vulnerable to the intrusion of racial bias because neither state is 
likely to completely eradicate the employer’s freedom to hire 
whomever they please.  Even as this freedom is limited by a 
prohibition on discriminatory hiring, enough discretion remains 
such that employers can easily manifest forms of racial bias that 
are difficult to prove in litigation.  As a result, tightening firing 
discretion amplifies the manifestation of racial bias in hiring.  In 
the context of strong job security protections, French employers 
have been reluctant to adopt even the most color-blind, innocuous 
measures such as the requirement that candidates submit 
anonymous CVs. 
Any proposed reform of employment law or employment 
discrimination law undertaken to combat discrimination and 
achieve equal employment opportunity must take these dynamics 
into account.  The French experience helps us imagine the 
possibility that a for-cause employment regime can create different 
and potentially worse problems of discrimination in employment 
than the ones that the at will regime has produced.  For-cause 
employment will benefit plaintiffs in Title VII termination cases, 
but, over time, how might it affect minorities entering the job 
market?  Might it exacerbate the racial minorities’ disadvantage in 
access to employment?  If so, to what extent? These are precisely 
the questions that need to be explored if employment law is to 
serve the goals of employment discrimination law.   
If equal opportunity is the goal of employment 
discrimination law, the effect of employment law norms on the 
overall employment prospects of disadvantaged groups in the long-
term requires far more attention than litigation has been able to 
generate.  Thus, a broader regulatory approach to employment 
discrimination and equal employment opportunity is needed, to 
supplement the remedies achieved when enforcement occurs 
primarily through litigation.200 Applying this big-picture approach 
 
200 I develop an argument in favor of a greater role for administrative agencies in 
achieving equal employment opportunity in Julie Chi-hye Suk, 
Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 455. 
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requires consideration of the following question?  What is worse 
for the long-term goal of eradicating racial disadvantage in 
employment, exclusion from entry into the labor market, or 
discriminatory termination? 
A definitive and detailed answer to this question is beyond 
the scope of this article, but I offer some preliminary 
considerations.  This question should not be answered in the 
abstract; it must take into account the realities of today’s 
workplace and the political economy of employment.  As 
Katherine V.W. Stone has documented in great depth, the 
American workplace has undergone a tremendous transformation 
throughout the twentieth century.  Up until the 1970s, employment 
for most American workers was centered on a single, primary 
employer.  Even though employment at will was the law, firms 
were generally set up with internal job ladders, and employees 
would advance in the ranks within the firm, with mutual 
expectations that the employee would stay with the employer for 
life.201 
But over the last thirty years, the structure of employment 
has changed significantly.  Now, most American workers have a 
“boundaryless career” that does not depend on notions of 
advancement within a single hierarchical organization.202 
Employees don’t expect to stay with the same firm for life, but 
they expect each new job to give them opportunities to improve 
their human capital.  In this universe, discriminatory failures to 
hire racial minorities may diminish their employment opportunities 
more severely in the long-run than discriminatory or otherwise 
unjust terminations.   Thus, equal employment opportunity requires 
a shift in focus from the discriminatory firing suits that dominate 
the Title VII docket towards legal and regulatory means of 
protecting and promoting racial equality at the hiring stage.   
 
B.  The Limits of Universalistic Solutions to Racial 
Inequality 
 
201 Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract, 48 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 519, 529-32 (2001).  Stone argues that this model emerged largely from 
scientific theories of management that were prevalent in the era of 
industrialization. 
202 Id. at 554. 
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The French resistance to race-targeted, race-conscious 
ways of mitigating the disadvantage of racial minorities, such as 
race-conscious affirmative action, also provides important lessons.  
Specifically, it should raise skepticism about the many race-neutral 
approaches that have been proposed as alternatives to race-
conscious affirmative action in the pursuit of equal opportunity.  In 
France, the race-blindness arises from a republican commitment to 
social solidarity, which directly conflicts with any race-conscious 
distribution of benefits.  The universalistic approach of French 
employment discrimination law reveals the belief that job security 
protections and protection against racial discrimination protect the 
same set of rights and interests, rather than interests that may 
conflict with each other.  Yet, it is clear that job security 
protections conflict with racial minorities’ equal access to 
employment. 
In the United States, employers’ use of affirmative action 
may get a lot of minorities hired, but even its most vocal advocates 
worry about affirmative action’s potential to harm the social 
solidarity that is essential to a truly integrated workplace.203 Doing 
what is best for the eradication of racial disadvantage in access to 
employment may be at odds with doing what is best from the 
standpoint of universal social welfare goals, such as employee job 
security and social solidarity.  American lawyers and scholars 
contemplating reforms to protect employee job security or to 
combat racial inequality in employment should anticipate conflicts 
between these two goals, rather than assuming that they are always 
compatible.  The French example shows how job security 
protections can freeze racial minorities out of labor markets, 
particularly when historical and social circumstances have 
contributed to their being undereducated and regarded as foreign.  
Job security protections under such conditions directly conflict 
with measures like the CPE that could improve racial minorities’ 
employment prospects.  Furthermore, the CPE itself was a 
universalistic solution to the particular problem of racial 
disadvantage:  The introduction of at-will employment applicable 
to all young people was proposed because there is no alternative of 
targeting benefits towards disadvantaged racial groups.    
 Job security protections and the pursuit of equal 
employment opportunity can impose mutual costs on each other.  
 
203 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Working Together, supra note __, at 89-90. 
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Universal job security protections might exclude racial minorities 
from the labor market in the long run, and measures that target 
benefits to racial minorities can have detrimental effects on social 
solidarity.  Universalistic, race-blind strategies for eradicating 
group disadvantage tend to obscure, if not deny, the possibility that 
promoting racial equality can conflict with promoting social 
welfare for all.  This is a conflict that equal employment 
opportunity law should negotiate and manage, rather than ignore. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Recognizing the reality of these conflicts and tensions 
intensifies the difficulty of proposing a solution to the problem of 
racial inequality in employment.  We cannot know with any 
certainty whether racial minorities would have been better off in 
the past if France had adopted American-style antidiscrimination 
law and at-will employment, just as we can’t know whether racial 
minorities in the United States would be better off today had Title 
VII not imposed a “tax” on minority hiring.  But it is clear, based 
on the two countries’ experiences, that limiting firing discretion 
increases discriminatory tendencies in hiring decisions.  If 
employment discrimination law is to improve equal employment 
opportunity, it must manage these dynamics with the goal of 
minimizing the overall effect of racial bias, overt and implicit, in 
racial minorities’ access to, and retention of, good jobs.  This may 
require job security protections in some contexts and at-will 
employment in others.   
 Unequal employment opportunity, in both the United 
Statesnd France, will continue to pose challenges for a long time.  
But the difficulty of finding a solution is no argument for avoiding 
an honest account of the problem. 
